Berkeley Political Review

The New Missile Crisis

On July 4, 2006 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, known as North Korea, threatened the tenuous stability in East Asia, making it arguably one of the most dangerous regions in the world. North Korea fired six short range missiles into the Sea of Japan and a long range missile, which, if perfected, has the capability of reaching the United States, but that faltered seconds after fired. This unleashed an international fervor among superpower states and a regional crisis, wondering what provoked North Korea to act in such a manner.
The most immediate cause has been that the Bush administration has taken a much tougher stance toward North Korea than previous administrations. Additionally, President Bush has made explicit comments that have made the North Korean government uneasy about their national security, including the infamous “axis of evil” speech. The administration’s foreign policy, actions and rhetoric have been viewed by North Koreans as particularly aggressive, with a willingness to use military action. North Korea’s anxieties regarding United States aggression can be seen in their letter to the IAEA regarding their withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty: “…US tyrannical nuclear crushing policy toward the DPRK… As soon as the Bush administration officials took power, they made it a policy to crush the DPRK with force of arms, and completely blocked the already-begun DPRK-US dialogue… “
President Bush followed his January 2002 State of the Union ‘axis of evil’ speech, on June 1, by declaring a new doctrine of preemptive military action against rogue states that participate in nuclear proliferation. As expected the North Korean’s perceived this as a prelude to future threats. North Korean negotiators have insisted that they would continue with nuclear developments until the United States entered into bilateral talks to draft a non-aggression pact.
In October of 2002 the Bush administration confronted the North Koreans about their clandestine uranium-enrichment program. As a result, the 1994 Agreed Framework Treaty, which requires North Korea to halt its nuclear ambitions in return for energy supply, unraveled in 2003 when North Koreans pulled out. In a joint article Jean du Preez (International Organizations Nonproliferation Program) and William Potter (Center for Nonproliferation Studies) said that, “North Korea's withdrawal from the treaty is in reaction to its inclusion in the ‘axis of evil’ and being targeted by the preemptive strike policy”.
The Iraq invasion, and subsequent war, were deciphered by the North Koreans as an omen for future aggression. James B. Steinberg, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, points out that “[g]overnment officials and analysts in this region [East Asia] are looking at Iraq through the lens of its implications for the crisis that affects them most directly—North Korea. All the countries in the region are anxiously awaiting signs of whether the U.S. action in Iraq presages a more confrontational approach to the DPRK.” With the uncertainties of future US aggression and the fact that they are targeted as an “outpost of tyranny,” the building of a military deterrent, evidenced by the missile launch, is a way for North Korea to “flex its muscle.”
When North Korea pulled out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003, a series of talks, referred to as the six party talks, were initiated among China, Russia, North Korea, the United States, Japan, and South Korea. The purpose was to find a peaceful means to resolve the issue. Daniel A. Pinkston, a North Korea expert, believes that the six party talks are now “dead.” For the North Koreans, the six party talks were a mechanism to get a non-aggression pact from the United States and a means to talk directly with the United States instead through intermediaries. Yet, the United States has refused any form of “official” direct talks with North Korea and maintains that all military options in regard to North Korea are “on the table.” In other words, no non-aggression pact is being offered by the United States. These contrary policy goals and diplomatic approaches have led experts to conclude that the six party talks are “dead.”
With the backdrop of the “axis of evil” statement, the Iraq war, the failed six party talks and the policy of preventive military strikes it should be clear that the missile launch was a message to the United States. This is even more true because of the symbolic decision to begin launching on the fourth of July and the fact that one was a long range missile that could theoretically reach the United States. While the message can be deciphered in different ways, the cause for the missile launches are clear: the North Koreans feel they are threatened by the United States and its regional allies. North Korea has made it clear that they capable of defending themselves and are capable of causing havoc in the region—in particular to the two United States allies: South Korea and Japan.
While the US is, typically, confident in its ability to defend against state attacks, the missile crisis should make clear that if the tenuous stability in the Korean peninsula was to collapse, North Korea would act aggressively toward all its enemies, including the US. Major attacks on South Korea and Japan, would lead to catastrophic human lose and crippling affects to the international and American economy. From a defensive perspective, North Korea, by attempting to launch a long range missile, made it clear that it may also attempt to launch attacks on the United States. Additionally, with China and Russia being allies of North Korea and with United States responsibilities to its East Asian allies, there are worse scenarios possible. These reactions by North Korea to the actions of the US will, in turn, have further consequences in the international arena.